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MEDIA ACCESS AND A FREE PRESS: PURSUING
FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES WITHOUT
IMPERILING FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
DON LIVELY*

The concept of free expression was constitutionalized' at a time when
public communication was highly personalized 2 and the roles of speaking
and listening were easily interchanged. Nearly two centuries later, however,
first amendment guarantees operate in a technological context that has operated to dichotomize those roles and create distinct classes of speakers and
listeners. The evolution of public expression, from a setting characterized by
unamplified speech, community forums, and hand printed or set publications, to one dominated by prolific and pervasive media forces has created
4
''3
Media concentration
great "distortions in [the] system of free expression.
and scarcity of media outlets 5 have lowered the ratio of communicators to
receivers and have contributed to the decline of face-to-face dialogue and the
6
rise of institutionalized information brokers.
The consequences of those changes have occasioned protective efforts to
safeguard first amendment values (if not always first amendment rights) by
attempting to regulate diversity into the mass media. Such diversification
schemes rest upon the principle that dissemination of information:
with as many different facets and colors as . . . possible . . . is

closely akin to, if indeed it is not the same as, the interest protected
by the First Amendment; it presupposes that right conclusions are
*

Law clerk for Hon. Jim R. Carrigan, Judge, United States District Court, Denver,

Colorado (1979-80). J.D., University of California, Los Angeles; M.S., Northwestern University; A.B., University of California, Berkeley.
1. U.S. Const. amend. I.
2. See Minow in S. SIMMONS, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND THE MEDIA at ix (1978);
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248 (1974).
3. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 653 (1970).
4. From 1923 to 1973, the percentage of American daily newspapers engaged in direct
competition withered from 60% to 5.4%. B. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
49 (1975). By the early 1970's, about half of the nation's daily newspapers were chain owned.
H. BRUCKER, COMMUNICATION IS POWER 333 (1973). Newspaper publishing thus had become
dominated by national newspaper chains and wire services. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249 (1974). Meanwhile, much of the programming control in broadcasting had come under the control of three major networks. See Robinson, The Federal CommunicationsCommzstn. An Essay on Regulatoy Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REV. 169, 260 (1978).
5. Between 1910 and 1978, the number of daily newspapers in the United States diminished from about 2,600 to about 1,750. See Comment, Local Monopoly in the Daly Newspaper
Indust, 61 YALE L.J 948, 949 n.12 (1952); 1979 Ed. & Pub. Int'l Y.B. (1979) pt. 1. Scarcity has
been engineered into radio and television broadcasting. The AM broadcasting band, which
runs from 535 KHz to 1605 KHz, includes 107 assignable channels. FM broadcasting, which
occupies frequencies between 88 KHz and 108 KHz, provides 100 assignable channels. M.
FRANKLIN, MASS MEDIA LAW 546-47 (1977). The Federal Communication Commission's television assignment plan provides for 620 VHF and 1400 UHF stations in the nation. Sixth
Report and Order on Television Allocations, 17 Fed. Reg. 3905, 1 R.R. 91:601 (1952).
6. See C. MILLS, POWER, POLITICS AND PEOPLE 353-55 (1963).
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most likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than
is, and
through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this
7
always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.
Government policies designed to promote diversity of expression in the
mass media have focused primarily upon broadcasting. Although the public
possesses a paramount right of access to information in the electronic forum,8 it only has limited speaking rights therein. Access rights arise only
upon the presentation of a controversial view on an issue of public importance,9 broadcast of a personal attack, 10 or appearance of a legally qualified
political candidate.11 Such opportunities create only narrow and contingent
access rights for ideas and individuals. Even such rudimentary access rights,
however, exceed those available in the print media, where the public has no
12
first amendment right of expression or information reception.
Efforts to structure diversity into the media 3 by providing special access rights have sought to correct imbalances in first amendment rights and
privileges. ' 4 Limited access has not proved to be entirely fit for that purpose, but so far proposals to carve out more expansive access rights have
failed to win lasting judicial favor. 1 5 Despite no record of significant victories on the legal battlefield, the banner of broader access rights continues to
lead a pursuit of first amendment values in the mass media. The purpose of
this article is to: (1) examine existing opportunities for limited access; (2)
ascertain why the concept of broader access rights survives despite judicial
rebukes; (3) assess the constitutional hurdles that a more sweeping access
system must clear; (4) suggest an access plan that would pass tests of constitutionality and practicality; (5) evaluate the implications of access for the
print media; and (6) consider whether access concepts may be rendered obsolete by the continuing evolution of the media.
7. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), af'd 326 U.S.
1 (1945).
8. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969).
9. In the Matter of the Handling of Public Issues under the Fairness Doctrine and the
Public Interest Standard of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 19 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Fairness Report].
10. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1977).
11. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1977).
12. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
13. Policies for promoting diversity of information in the mass media may be broken down
into categories of direct and indirect content regulation. Indirect content regulation consists of
policies intended to structure the media so that it is more conducive to multiple views. Prominent examples of indirect content regulation include the Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1801-04 (1976), which is designed to save failing newspapers through rules limiting the
number of broadcasting outlets a single entity may own. See Multiple Ownership Rules, 47
C.F.R. §§ 73.35, 73.240, 73.636 (1979). Direct content regulation is restricted to the electronic
forum, which is governed by fairness rules and regulations providing limited access opportunities upon the airing of controversial views, personal attacks, or appearances of political candidates. See Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 1; 47 C.F.R. § 73.369 (1977); 47 U.S.C. § 315.
14. See Barron, Access to the Press- A New First Amendment Rght, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641,
1647-48 (1967).
15. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
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I.

THE EXISTING CONTOURS OF ACCESS

Media access rights range from limited to none depending upon the
nature of the media form. In the print media, editors have the sole discretion in deciding what material to print. 6 Although any enforceable right of
access to newspaper space may conflict with the first amendment,' 7 restricted access rights in the electronic forum so far have survived such constitutional confrontation. 18 Thus the Supreme Court, in Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, encased and elevated the public's right in broadcasting "to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and
experiences."' 9 Those access rights, however, have been specifically and narrowly drawn and reflect a general regulatory strategy of promoting fair and
20
balanced programming.
The most conspicuous manifestation of that approach, and most prominent right of access in the electronic forum, is embodied by the fairness doctrine. 21 The underlying premise of fairness regulation, that the public
interest requires opportunities for expression of contrasting viewpoints on
issues of public importance, dates back more than half a century.22 Essentially, the fairness doctrine obligates broadcasters to set aside reasonable
amounts of air time for coverage of public issues and to provide opportunities for contrasting points of view. 2 3 By properly discharging their fairness
duties, broadcasters presumably provide their audiences a balanced diet of
24
information on public issues.
Fairness obligations arise upon presentation of "a controversial issue of
public importance. ' 25 However, the duty to provide balanced programming does not vest any person or group with the right to present an opposing
viewpoint.2 6 Instead, broadcasters retain discretion to "decide what issues
are 'important,' how 'fully' to cover them, and what format, time and style
of coverage are 'appropriate.' "27 Access rights under the fairness doctrine
thus operate on behalf of ideas rather than exponents of ideas and are
designed to meet a first amendment standard requiring not "that everyone
16. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
17. Id at 254.
18. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101-02 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969).
19. 395 U.S. at 390. The public's right to receive information in the electronic forum arose
from a balancing of the first amendment interests of broadcasters and the public in a context
"[w]here there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate." Id at 388. Given the scarcity of broadcasting frequencies, and the danger that
some ideas and views might go unexpressed, the Court concluded that the first amendment was
not a bar to government regulations obligating broadcasters to function as fiduciaries and present representative voices and opinions. Id at 389.
20. A right of access arises only in response to the broadcasting of controversial views,
personal attacks, or appearance of political candidates. See supra notes 9-11.
21. See Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 7.
22. Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Radio Comm'n App. Rev. 32 (1929); rev'd on
other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. d.mised, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
23. Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 7.
24. Id
25. Id at 10.
26. Id. at 18.
27. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 189 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:1

shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said." 28 The resulting
"separation of the advocate from the expression of his views" leaves broadcasters rather than the public with the power to initiate debate and maintain
29
editorial control of it.
When the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) receives a complaint that a broadcaster's programming is one-sided, 30 the licensee's edito31
rial judgment is tested against a standard of reasonableness and good faith.
If the Commission finds merit in the complaint, it ordinarily asks the broad32
caster to provide air time for a balancing viewpoint.
A broadcaster's affirmative duty under the fairness doctrine to cover
issues of public importance 33 is the only obligation licensees have to provide
programming opportunities for such matters. That responsibility may be
attenuated at the expense of robust debate, though, if programming decisions reflect anxieties that controversy may alienate audiences and advertisers. 34 Even a program with a large audience would be unprofitable if
advertisers did not want to be identified with it. But the suggestion that it is
"bad business to espouse . . . the heterodox or controversial . . . 35 or that
advertisers are paranoid about being identified with controversy 36 is capable
of being stretched too far. To the extent that advertising is an essential step
toward commercial profit, 37 in a nation where the electronic media are
plugged into more than ninety-eight percent of the homes 38 and operate in a
context of spectrum scarcity, 39 it is less than a foregone conclusion that controversy necessarily will lead to self-censorship or non-sponsorship.
Although fairness regulation relies heavily upon good faith licensee decisions, its history is not devoid of triumphant moments. The fairness doctrine, for instance, was the triggering mechanism for a widespread
information campaign to counter cigarette advertisements and educate the
public about the hazards of cigarette smoking. 4° Any such specific benefits,
however, must be measured not only against the overall performance of fair28. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTrrUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE

25-28 (1960).
29. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S 94, 189 (1973) (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
30. The Commission depends upon the public to bring fairness problems to its attention.

Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 18.

31. Id at 20.
32. Id at 17.
33. Id at 7.
34. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 187-89 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications ress, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213, 231-32; Comment, Enforcing the Obligationto Present ControversialIssues." The Forgotten Halfof the Fai ness Doctrine,
10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 137, 148-50 (1975).
35. 412 U.S. at 187.
36.

10 HARV.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. at 148-50.

37. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771, n.24 (1976).
38. By 1978, 98.6% of the nation's homes had at least one radio and 98% of them had at
least one television. Broadcasting Y.B. Section C, at 341 (1979).
39. The FCC limits and assigns broadcasting frequencies to avoid confusion and chaos on
the airwaves. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-76, nn.4 & 5, 388
(1969); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943). See also supra, note 5.
40. The FCC, upon determining that cigarette advertisements implied that smoking was
healthful, ordered broadcasters to furnish free air time for anti-cigarette spots. WCBS-TV, 8
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ness in promoting first amendment values but also its compatibility with the
first amendment itself. And "[u]nlike some venerable institutions, . . . old
age has hardly secured the fairness doctrine from the tarnish of corrosive
4
controversy." 1
Fairness policing poses the most potent threat to first amendment guarantees of free speech and press. By directing licensees to provide opportunities for balancing viewpoints, the FCC elevates its own editorial judgments
over those of broadcasters. Fairness enforcement, therefore, requires the
Commission at times to arrogate to itself the reins of editorial control.
In striving to accommodate the competing concerns of diverse information and government restraint, the FCC has pursued a general philosophy of
least possible intrusion. Policy manifestations of that regulatory attitude in
fairness matters have included agency reliance primarily upon licensee judgment and discretion. The Commission thus operates under the assumption
that the public is best served, not by having the agency make decisions as to
what is desirable in each situation, but "by a system which allows individual
broadcasters considerable discretion in selecting the manner of coverage, the
appropriate spokesmen, and the techniques of production and presentation."' 42 Given the potentially unlimited number of controversial issues in
some communities, agency deference to reasonable and good faith licensee
judgment 4 3 evinces a realistic sense of regulatory limitations.
Nonetheless, a fundamental and persisting problem with fairness regulation is not merely that the standard is "difficult to determine, but the fact
that someone other than the speaker . . . with far-reaching enforcement
powers . . . has the task of determining it." ' 4 4 It already is established that
the Commission is "more than a traffic policeman concerned with the technical aspects of broadcasting and that it [may interest] . . .itself in general
program format and the kinds of programs broadcast by licensees." ' 45 If the
FCC were to conclude that licensees were too timorous in their program46
ming, it would have wide-ranging enforcement powers at its disposal.
Fairness enforcement at the very least contemplates agency oversight of
and balancing supplements for a broadcaster's own programming decisions.
However, the Commission's arsenal of enforcement weapons includes its license granting, renewing, and revoking authority 47 and power to impose
fines. 48 In a zone where the FCC's "lifted eyebrow" may be sufficient to
achieve regulatory objectives, 49 the mere availability of powerful enforceF.C.C.2d 381, aJf'don rehearng, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967), afd sub nom Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d
1082 (D.C.Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
41. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 703 (1976) (Commissioner
Robinson dissenting).
42. Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 16.

43. Id at 11.
44. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 707-08 (Commissioner Robinson dissenting).
45. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 395 (1969).
46. d at 393.
47. The Commission may revoke a station's license, issue a short-term renewal or refuse to
renew a license. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(d), 312(b) (1976).
48. 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1976).
49. Regulation by lifted eyebrow may occur in the form of a letter or phone inquiry from,
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ment devices and potential for their misuse create a lingering threat to expression. Fairness controls enable "administration after administration [if
they so choose] to toy with radio or TV in order to serve . . . sordid or...
50
benevolent ends."
In any event, the Commission, through its general policy of deference to
licensee discretion, so far has endeavored to minimize government influence
upon broadcast fare. 5 1 Thus the agency has concluded that "further government intrusion is less desirable than the possibility of occasional licensee
lapses."' 52 Accordingly, the FCC's record as a disciplinarian is devoid of any
punishment for a broadcaster who failed to comply with the fairness doctrine. 53 The agency's reluctance to become entangled in fairness complaints
54
is illustrated by the rarity of fairness findings against licensees.
The advantages of such leniency and restraint, however, do not diminish the generally negative effects and potential of fairness regulation. Fairness cannot optimally promote diversity unless energetically enforced, but
aggressive policing creates a danger of undue government influence in programming. No matter how administered, therefore, the fairness principle
translates into an unsatisfactory proposition.
Despite its drawbacks and dangers, fairness regulation continues to govern the electronic forum on the assumption that it enhances rather than
55
abridges the first amendment guarantees of free speech and a free press.
Fairness in practice, however, creates a hierarchy of free speech rights. The
unusual ordering of rights, 56 that makes paramount the public's right to information, 57 allows some persons or government to "snuff out" 58 the first
amendment rights of others. Fairness regulation at its constitutional worst,
therefore, creates gradations of speaking rights and restricts the speech of
59
some members of society to magnify the relative voice of others.
Policymaking presuming that a more regulated press necessarily will
translate into a more perfect press must assume whatever risk that attaches
to disregarding past lessons of tampering with individual speech and puband expression of concern by the agency's staff to a licensee. Robinson, The FCC and the First
Amendment- Observationson 40 Years ofRadio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67, 119-20
(1967).
50. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 154 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
The regulatory process for broadcasting has tempted past presidential administrations to manipulate it for mischievous purposes. See S. SIMMONS, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND THE ME-

DIA 219-20 (1978); Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213,
244-51; Comment, Power in the Marketplaceof Ideas: The Fainess Doctin)e and the First Amendment,
52 TEX. L. REV. 727, 763-64 (1974).
51. Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 8, 23.
52. Public Communications, Inc., 50 F.C.C.2d 395, 401 (1974).
53.

M.

FRANKLIN, MASS MEDIA LAW 748 (1977).

54. During the sample years of 1973 and 1974, for instance, only 19 out of 4,280 fairness
complaints received by the Commission resulted in findings against licensees. Reconsideration
of the Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 709 (Commissioner Robinson dissenting).
55. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969).
56. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101-02 (1973).
57. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969).
58. Id at 387.
59. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
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lishing rights. 60 The Sedition Act, for instance, purportedly was conceived
to elevate the level of public discourse - but more accurately could be catalogued as a government "attempt to eliminate political criticism, create a
one-party press in the country, and by controlling public opinion insure...
victory in the elections." '6 1 Especially given such lessons in government perversion of first amendment rights in the name of first amendment values, the
fairness concept should be recognized as a regulatory form of suspect and
62
potentially damaging character.
II.

THE PURSUIT OF MORE ACCESS

A general right of access for multiple voices, as well as views, was conceived to equalize the power to communicate ideas and to protect rights of
expression by creating more opportunities for their exercise. 63 Essentially, a
public right of access would lower media barriers to the entry of unedited
community voices. The proffered basis for such a right to be heard is the
interest in confrontation of ideas from more voices. 64
The first major constitutional showdown over access occurred in the
electronic forum, where limited access inroads, carved out by fairness regulation, already had been made. Initially, but only temporarily, it was determined that a blanket prohibition on paid public issue advertising
contravened the first amendment. 6 5 That expansion of access rights, however, failed to survive an appeal to the Supreme Court which, in CBS v.

Democratic NationalCommittee,6 6 concluded that the public's right to information already was protected adequately by the fairness doctrine. 6 7 In the
past, the Court had suggested a possible reevaluation of fairness regulation if
it failed to measure up to expectations. 68 Despite the demonstrated flaws of
fairness, however, the Court refused to abandon such regulation in favor of
access. Rather, a right of access was rejected as "too radical a therapy" that
exceeded the FCC's authority. 69 Although the Court reaffirmed the public's
paramount right of access to information in the electronic forum, 70 a right of
71
public expression in that arena remained illusory.
60. Brandywine Main-Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 79 (1972) (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
61.

L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY:

LEGACY

OF SUPPRESSION 258 (1960).

62. Even backers of fairness acknowledge that it "has not always brought to the public
perfect or, indeed, even consistently high-quality treatment of all public events and issues
". CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 130-31 (1973).
63.

Barron, Access to te Press: A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1647-

48 (1967).
64. Id at 1678.
65. Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 646 (D.C. Cir.
1971), rev'd sub nom. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
66. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). Despite its willingness to uphold limited access rights created by
fairness regulation, the Court rejected the argument that broadcasters were constitutionally obligated to sell at least some of their time for unedited discussion of public issues.
67. Id
68. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 393 (1969).
69. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127 (1973).
70. Id at 102.
71. Id at 130-31.
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The failure to secure broader access rights in a forum characterized by
spectrum scarcity augured unfavorably for the prospect of access in a medium distinguished by multiple channel capacity. Accordingly, an effort to
establish a foothold for access in cablecasting failed to survive judicial scrutiny. 72 The FCC, which in CBSv. Democratic National Committee had opposed
radio or television access, nonetheless had determined that cable access channels served a useful social purpose. 73 Consequently, it had directed cablecasters to furnish public, governmental, educational, and leased access
channels. 74 Despite the agency's assertion that cablecasting access served
first amendment values by facilitating an exchange of ideas, 75 the Supreme
Court in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. concluded that such regulatory provisions exceeded the FCC's authority. 76 Since cable operators are not common carriers, 77 the Court disallowed imposition of common carrier duties
upon them. 78 In so doing, it reiterated that such intrusions "on the journalistic integrity of broadcasters would overshadow any benefits associated with
79
the resulting public access."
Shortly after the Court's second rebuff to broader access rights, the access issue resurfaced again when a corporation attempted to purchase network time for presentation of its own editorial advertisements.80 The
networks, at least partly out of concern that the messages would be too controversial, refused to sell the air time. 8 ' Since the advertiser's purpose was to
present its views and take stands on controversial public issues, fairness obligations probably would have been triggered by such messages.8 2 The company, by insisting that its first amendment rights had been infringed, and
the networks, by refusing to sell air time,8 3 merely replayed the same right of
access versus editorial control arguments aired in CBS v. Democratic National
Committee. Given the case law on the networks' side, their position for practical purposes was legally unassailable.
Although government is "constitutionally disqualified from dictating
the subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers who may address a public issue," 8 4 a licensee's refusal to admit speakers into the elec8 5
tronic forum does not necessarily constitute government action.
72.
73.

FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
Report and Order in Docket No. 20508, 59 F.C.C.2d 294, 296 (1976).

74. 47 C.F.R. § 76.254 (1977).
75. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 695 (1979).
76. Id at 708.
77. Common carriers make "a public offering to provide [communicatons facilities]
whereby all members of the public who choose to employ such facilities may communicate or
transmit intelligence of their own design and choosing ..
" Report and Order, Industrial
Radiolocation Service, 5 F.C.C.2d 197, 202 (1966). See 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976).
78. 440 U.S. at 708-09.
79. Id at 705.
80. Newsweek, July 2, 1979, at 57.
81. Id
82. Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 23.
83. Newsweek, July 2, 1979, at 57.
84. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-85 (1978).
85. In CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), three justices concluded that
licensee action in refusing to sell time for editorial advertisements did not amount to government action. Id at 117-19. One justice was unwilling to decide the issue. Id at 146 (White, J.,
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Consequently, the first amendment may preclude government from channeling the flow of ideas and views,8 6 but media operators have been left free
(subject only to such specialized restrictions as fairness) to function as forum
8 7
bouncers.
Despite two adverse decisions by the Supreme Court in less than a decade, media access has not been abandoned as a promotional vehicle for first
amendment values. The continuing pursuit of access, in fact, derives a measure of its lingering vitality from the Court's own observation that "at some
future date Congress or the Commission - or the broadcasters - may devise some kind of limited right of access that is both practicable and desirable."' 8 Although the Court twice has struck down access schemes, it has
refused to bury the concept completely. Still, the future of access hinges
upon the structuring of a system that can prove itself to be "practicable and
desirable."
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR ACCESS

Although broad public access is cosmetically alluring as a means for
advancing the cause of diversity, it also may pose significant constitutional
hazards. By downgrading the speaking rights of broadcasters and upgrading
those of the public, media access as a matter of right leaves nobody constitutionally whole. Even if a redistribution of first amendment rights may represent a "delicately balanced system of regulation intended to serve the
interests of all concerned," 89 such a scheme also may be pregnant with mischief.
The First Amendment may indeed belong to everybody-but it
cannot truly belong to everybody unless it first belongs to each and
every particular somebody. To deny the individual right in the
name of the collective right transforms the First Amendment from
a guarantee of individual freedom into its very opposite, rule by
9
public clamor. 0
Since an unusual ordering of speech rights has been permitted for purposes of fairness regulation, conceivably such a hierarchy could pass judicial
muster for purposes of broader access. If so, media access - like fairness
regulation - might be justified upon grounds of spectrum scarcity. 9 ' A renewed life for the scarcity rationale, however, would prolong the mythology
that special operating circumstances of broadcasting require special regulaconcurring). Two justices concluded that the issue was irrelevant. Id at 148 (Blackmun and
Powell, JJ., concurring). Two justices reasoned that because government regulated broadcasting, and the airwaves are part of the public domain, government action existed. Id. at 174-79
(Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Theoretically, therefore, the goVernment action argument still is alive.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785 (1978).
Segenerally CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 125 (1973).
Id at 131.
Id at 102.
Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 707 (Commissioner Robinson

dissenting).

91. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-92 (1969). Se generally, NBC
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943).
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tion. 9 2 In reality, newspapers (which are not subject to any form of access
regulation) already had become more scarce than broadcasting outlets when
the Supreme Court lent its imprimatur to the scarcity rationale for fairness
regulation. 93 Although the scarcity dogma continues to operate, widespread
criticism 94 may deplete it of any supportive strength if and when broader
access rights emerge. Consequently, the pursuit of access may necessitate a
search for more persuasive rationales.
One proposed justification for access, that actually preceded the scarcity
rationale, is that a community's interest and dependence upon the media
warrant reasonable access thereto. 95 Another suggested rationale posits that
a right of free speech presupposes a right of access to the instrumentalities of
expression, because speaking rights are meaningless absent effective means
for communicating. 96 Such proposed foundations for access rights essentially invite balancing the public's interest in expression against the interests
of media operators. In so doing, they too would foster a hierarchy of rights
similar to what exists under the fairness doctrine.
It also has been propounded that "the constitutional values of equality
and liberty are fundamentally linked by the notion that equal access to cer'9 7
tain institutions . . . is a prime component of any meaningful liberty."
Such an "equality principle suggests that if government surveillance can be
minimized and compulsion over the private owners of the medium limited to
a content-neutral principle, such as a statutory right to paid advertising,
then a court should view sympathetically government action to overcome
the impact of private censorship. '"98
Despite the ingenuity of the equal liberty premise, it too abandons first
amendment rights in a rush toward first amendment values. Media access
rights inevitably diminish broadcasters' expression rights by confiscating
time that could have been devoted to their own presentations. 99 Program92. Scarcity of frequencies is one reason why broadcasting has been subjected to constitutional standards different from those applied to other media forms. Mt. Mansfield Television,
Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470, 477 (2d Cir. 1971). Other perceived characteristics used to justify
broadcasting regulation include its "uniquely pervasive" and intrusive nature. FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 128
(1973).
93. Robinson, The Federal Commnuications Commission: An Essay on Regulatog Watchdogs, 64
VA. L. REV. 169, 257 (1978).
94. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 699 (1978); Karst, Equality as a Central
Pnnaple of the Fist Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 49-61 (1975).

95. An Ohio court, without addressing the constitutional implications, upheld a right to
purchase newspaper advertising on that basis. Uhlman v. Sherman, 31 Ohio Dec. 54 (1919).
96. Wollam v. City of Palm Springs, 59 Cal. 2d 276, 284, 379 P.2d 481, 486, 29 Cal. Rptr.
1, 6 (1963).
97. Karst, supra note 94, at 43-44.
98. Id at 51.
99. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-57 (1974). The
Supreme Court has recognized that compelling a publisher to print material, that he otherwise

might not publish, deprives him of space that might be used for other purposes including selfexpression. Id The Court has refused to apply the logic of that principle to broadcasting,
although it has been urged to do so. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386
(1969). Despite basing its holding in Red Lion upon the principle of spectrum scarcity, it refused
in Tornillo to carry the newspaper scarcity analogy as far, or even to mention the contrasting
decision in Red Lton.
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ming decisions concerning content, treatment, and exposure constitute the
exercise of journalistic discretion and editorial control.' 00 Any encroachment thereon will inevitably affect the editorial process and product.' 0 '
Since the curbing of some rights of expression to enhance the voice of
others is foreign to the first amendment, 10 2 it is difficult to rationalize access
rights without the aid of factual or legal fictions and without ultimately derogating the first amendment's protection against press abridgment. Although promotion of first amendment values may be a worthy undertaking,
the principal guideline for such a venture is the first amendment; "and one
hard and fast principle that it announces is that Government shall keep its
hands off the press."' 10 3 Even if the government may endeavor to promote
robust and vigorous discourse, "it is precluded by the First Amendment from
. . .suppressing expression, even where government would justify such in'0 4
trusion on personal liberty as a pursuit of First Amendment values."'

IV.

A

CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRACTICABLE ACCESS PLAN

Creation of an access system that does not abridge first amendment
rights requires voluntary rather than compulsory participation by media operators. A voluntary scheme would not transgress the law enunciated in CBS
v. Democratic National Committee, since the Court addressed the issue of
mandatory rather than optional access.10 5 Before any such plan could leave
the drawing board, however, it would have to pass a four-part test devised
by the FCC. Specifically, no access system would be acceptable unless it
assured that: (1) important issues did not escape timely discussion; (2) licensee discretion was maintained; (3) no right of access accrued to particular
persons and groups; and (4) government was not drawn into deciding who
06
received air time and when.'
The "first serious attempt"' 1 7 to meet those criteria would afford broadcasters an option to provide an hour of public access time each week. 10
Instead of being obligated to balance programming on controversial matters
of public interest, licensees who opted for such an access would be in presumptive compliance with fairness requirements.' 0 9 Although the FCC originally determined that the access proposal was neither perfected nor ready
for adoption as a rule," 0 it since has undertaken to reevaluate the plan."l
100. 418 U.S. at 258.
101. Chatzky and Robinson, A Constztutonal Right of Access to Newspapers. Is There Life afler
Tornillo?, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 453, 480 (1976).
102. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1974).
103. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 160-61 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
104. L. TRIBE, supra note 94, at 604.
105. See 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 712,
n.26 (Commissioner Robinson dissenting).
106. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 699.
107. Id.
108. See Id at 712; National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095, 1112
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
109. 567 F.2d at 1112.
110. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 699.
111. A federal appeals court determined that the Commission may have "overlooked" and
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Essentially, the scheme would provide access in two separate ways. Half
of a station's access time would be allocated on a first come, first served
basis." 12 To prevent system monopolization, the remaining access time
would be provided to representative speakers. 1 3 Even though the Commission originally rejected the proposal, it may have underestimated the plan's
14
capacity for meeting the agency's standards."
Even if a broadcaster furnished time merely to a reasonable spectrum of
views, greater programming diversity probably would result than when an
individual broadcaster reserves all content decisions for himself. 1 5 A belief
that important issues would not escape timely discussion in such a setting to
some extent rests on faith. However, "[i]f an issue is truly of public importance, it is reasonable to presume that it will reach the public forum that an
adequate access policy would provide." ' 1 6 Especially in comparison to fairness regulation, it is less likely that pertinent public issues would escape attention. Although a broadcaster has an affirmative obligation under the
fairness doctrine to cover public issues, only in rare circumstances will the
FCC determine that a public issue is so important that it would be unreason17
able for a licensee to neglect it entirely."
Licensee discretion, which the FCC and the Supreme Court insist must
not be "subordinate[d] to private whim,"" 8 would be preservable under a
voluntary access plan. If licensees could choose freely whether to adopt an
access system, selection of that option alone would seem to be an exercise of
licensee discretion. Merely affording broadcasters that opportunity to select,
however, may not withstand agency or judicial scrutiny. Both the Commission and a court have insisted upon preserving the discretion to determine
what issues merit coverage initially and what coverage necessitates the presentation of balancing views." ' 9 Even if voluntary access vested non-media
operators with editorial control, broadcasters who adopted such a scheme
still would have unimpaired discretion to initiate and pursue coverage of
issues that they chose themselves. Voluntary access, therefore, would impose
no undue restraints upon overall licensee discretion.
Both the Supreme Court and the FCC have expressed apprehension of
and opposition to any access scheme that would allow any individual or
not have fully understood the proposal. Consequently, it remanded the matter to the agency.
National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
112. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 692.
113. Id
114. See National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095, 1113 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
115. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 713 (Commissioner Robinson
dissenting).
116. Petition of Committee for Open Media for Reconsideration and/or Clarification of the
Fairness Report at 12 (F.C.C., filed Aug. 12, 1974). Experimental use of public access "free
speech messages" has yielded wide-ranging public participation and discussion on issues of public concern. See id at 12 and Attachment A.
117. Fairness Report, supra note 9, at 10.
118. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 692; CBS v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 123 (1973).
119. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095, 1113 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
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group to purchase or otherwise obtain a dominant position in the system. 120
Even under a first come, first served plan, it has been suggested that "the
views of the affluent could well prevail over those of others, since they would
have it within their power to purchase time more frequently."' 2 1 Voluntary
access, however, need not be vulnerable to any special access privilege or
leverage. The possibility of undue influence seemingly could be minimized
by allocating half of a station's access time to representative spokespersons
who would qualify to speak, for instance, by collecting a certain number of
signatures on a petition circulated in their community or group. Although it
is unlikely that any allocation scheme would be tamper proof against manipulations by bad faith or biased licensees, it is equally improbable that-oppor122
tunities for abuse would be any greater than under the fairness doctrine.
Moreover, such anxieties over apportionment rest upon presumptions rather
than actual evidence that wealthy voices necessarily would be more inclined
to speak or have significant influence if they did. 123 It also seems unreasonably speculative to assert a risk of monopolization by the affluent, given funding possibilities for others from foundations, public interest groups, and
124
resource pooling.
In any event, concerns that some categories of individuals or ideas may
25
have more exposure than others are antagonistic to the first amendment.'
In evaluating the viewpoints expressed by any speaker, the public may consider the source of the message and credibility of the advocate. 126 The mere
disclosure of a speaker's identity probably would suffice to alert the public,
if necessary, to evaluate the views they hear. The Supreme Court has observed that only in broadcasting does limited access to the channels of communication not contravene the first amendment.' 2 7 Yet, no less with
electronic transmissions than any other means of communication, the public
may judge and evaluate the relative merits of conflicting viewpoints. 128
Even though the framers of the first amendment may not have anticipated
the emergence of the electronic media, the possibility that the public might
not scrutinize the information and ideas communicated is a danger they con129
templated and a risk they assumed.
It may be impossible to strike a perfect balance of viewpoints and safeguard against all potential abuses in a voluntary access system, but such
incapabilities should not unduly demean such a system. Rather it probably
120. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 123 (1973).
121. Id
122. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 713-14 (Commissioner Robinson dissenting).
123. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789-90 (1978).
124. See Jaffe, The Editoria/ Responsibility ofthe Broadcaster. Refections on Fairnessand Access, 85
HARV. L. REv. 768, 787 (1972). Public interest groups themselves have complained about the
reluctance of broadcasters to sell them air time for editorial advertisements. See Airing of Public
Service Announcements by Broadcast Licensees, 43 Fed. Reg. 37725, 37726, n.12, Aug. 24,
1978.
125. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 163 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
126. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978).
127. Id. at 792 n.30.
128. Id at 791.
129. Id at 792.
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is more useful to measure voluntary access not against perfection but against
the performance of fairness regulation. Although some questions about actends
cess may be answerable only from experience, experience with fairness
130
to suggest that "the law couldn't be any worse than it now is."
A voluntary access plan finally would remove the FCC farther away
from programming decisions. 13 1 Under a fairness system, wherein licensees
without public input determine the coverage of public issues, government
interference, in the form of agency second-guessing and content review, is
unavoidable. 132 Government participation in programming decisions is
contrary to the spirit if not the letter of the FCC's stated refusal to be drawn
33
into deciding who should receive air time and when. 1 An access system, in
contrast, would diminish the government's supervisory function. No scheme
short of complete agency abdication would eliminate government monitoring altogether, but access would alter oversight responsibilities to those of
making quantitative rather than qualitative judgments.
Although it is possible to structure a voluntary access system that works
on paper, it is essential that such access provide meaningful speaking opportunities for the public. If, for example, access time were relegated to hours of
134
A govlow audience potential, such a system would be seriously flawed.
would
times
at
particular
programming
access
ernment directive requiring
Consisaccess.
of
nature
constitutional)
thus
(and
undermine the voluntary
tent with notions of voluntariness, though, the FCC could create incentives
designed to encourage access programming during preferred viewing hours.
Non-compulsory encouragement of access programming would fit
within a broader category of diversity promoting policies for the mass media.
Especially since some diversity-oriented policies are burdensome to or restrictive of licensees, the possibility of regulation trade-offs or immunities exists as
inducement for excellence in access programming. Such flexible regulation
seemingly would serve the public interest efficiently by custom tailoring to
specific circumstances those policies that best would facilitate the interests of
diversity. 135
A "practicable and desirable" access system, for instance, would serve
directly the same goal that station ownership restrictions serve indirectly and
130. Study of Fairness Doctrine, 30 F.C.C.2d 26, 36 (1971) (Commissioner Johnson concurring).
131. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095, 1114 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
132. Id.
133. Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 699.
134. The Commission has noted that the effectiveness of public affairs type programming
depends upon audience size and variety, which in turn depends upon the time such programming is scheduled. See Rose Broadcasting Co., 68 F.C.C.2d 1242, 1253 (1978); United Broadcasting Co., 59 F.C.C.2d 1412, 1415 (1976); The Outlet Co., 57 F.C.C.2d 611, 613 (1975);
Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650,
678-79 (1971).
135. The FCC may "seek in the public interest to certify as licensees those who would speak
out with fresh voice, would most naturally initiate, encourage and expand diversity of approach
and viewpoint." Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denzed, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). In a similar spirit, the Commission might target its rules in a
manner that would most effectively enhance diversity of ideas and information.
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less effectively.' 3 6 Such rules have been designed to procure diversity of
views from diversity of ownership.' 3 7 That purpose, however, is impaired by
a frequency allocation scheme 38 that curtails the availability of outlets in a
community and by the failure to resolve the problem of horizontal concentration that limits a viewer's choice primarily to the offerings of the national
commercial networks.1 39 If an effective access system, therefore, would provide the diversity sought by ownership limitations, the Commission properly
might consider loosening those restrictions for broadcasters with impressive
access records.
The licensing process itself provides ample room and opportunity for
encouraging excellence in access programming. By regarding access programming during peak viewing hours as "superior service" 4° or "meritorious programming"'' 4 1 for renewal purposes, for instance, the FCC might
foster more access programming during desirable time slots. Extensive and
well placed access programming, especially during prime viewing hours,
might even create a rebuttable presumption that a broadcaster operated in
42
the public interest during the term of his license.'
In providing incentives for access, it is necessary that some caution be
exercised to assure that inducements are not actually a guise for regulatory
coercion. The distinction between blandishment and subtle arm-twisting
may be a fine one. However, the boundaries of impropriety are probably
best drawn at the point where free choice becomes encumbered by suspect
alternatives. An offer to eliminate fairness duties in exchange for adopting
an access scheme, for instance, would seem to be a proposition crossing that
line. By conditioning freedom from a constitutionally suspect system upon
136. A broadcast licensee is not allowed to own more than one station of the same type in
the same market. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35(a), 73.240(a)(1), 73.636(a)(1) (1979). Nor may a single
licensee own more than seven AM, seven FM and seven television stations. 47 C.F.R.
§§ 73.35(b), 73.240(a)(2), 73.636(b)(2) (1979).
137. See Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1108 (1975), aJ'd in part, vacated in part
sub noma.
National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1978), a 'd
in part, rev'd in part 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
138. See supra note 4.
139. Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission." An Essay on Regulatog, Watchdogs, 64
VA. L. REV. 169, 260 (1978).
140. A superior service rating gives a licensee a plus over any competitor for his license in a
renewal proceeding. Superior service has been found to be "highly relevant . . . and might be
expected to prevail absent some clear and strong showing by the challenger." Central Florida
Enterprises v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
141. A meritorious programming rating may neutralize the significance of a licensee's misconduct or rule violations during a license term. Set Rust Communicatons Group, Inc., 54
F.C.C.2d 419 (1975); Oil Shale Broadcasting Co., 52 F.C.C.2d 1167 (1975); Action Radio, Inc.,
51 F.C.C.2d 803 (1975); Friendly Broadcasting Co., 35 F.C.C.2d 611 (1972).
142. Such credit for excellence in access programming would recognize contributions that
likely would be directed toward "[tlhe major elements usually necessary to meet the public
interest includ[ing]: (1) Opportunity for Local Self-Expression, (2) The Development and Use
of Local Talent, (3) Programming for Children, (4) Religious Programs, (5) Educational Programs, (6) Public Affairs Programs,. . . (8) Political Broadcasts, (9) Agricultural Programs, (10)
News Programs,. . . (12) Sports Programs (13) Service to Minority Groups, (14) Entertainment
Programming. Those elements of the public interest unlikely to be served by access (i.e., (7)
Editorialization by Licensees. . . (11) Weather and Market Reports. . .) ordinarily would be
performed by the licensee. Granting of a radio or television license is conditioned upon the
FCC's determination that "the public convenience, interest or necessity would be served thereby
.
..47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1976).
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enactment of a different diversification plan, the offer would deny broadcasters the opportunity to determine whether they wanted any access system
whatsoever - and thus would undermine any genuine voluntariness. Since
voluntary adoption of access probably is the most fundamental element of a
constitutional access plan, it is essential that a broadcaster's decision not be
occasioned by illusory choices.
V.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRINT MEDIA

Even if a practicable and desirable access plan were structured for the
electronic forum, such a system would not necessarily be constitutionally
transferable to the print media. Although the Supreme Court has noted that
some form of access eventually may be acceptable in broadcasting, 143 it has
been unable to conceive how governmental regulation of the print media's
editorial process can be exercised consistent with first amendment guaran1 44
tees of a free press.
The Court's willingness to consider access in the electronic but not the
print media reflects a dualistic perspective that has permitted deeper regulatory incursions into broadcasting than into publishing. ' 45 The variable standards are an outgrowth of the premise that different media forms have
different characteristics warranting different types and measures of regulation. 146 Consistent with such a compartmentalized philosophy of media policy review, the Court has concluded that "it is idle to posit an unabridgeable
First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every indi147
vidual to . . . publish."'
By insisting upon regarding different media forms in different ways, the
Court has afforded publishers constitutionally preferred treatment. 148 But
despite "the sweeping and conclusive fashion in which the Court rejected the
constitutionality of access [in the print media, the rebuff] . . . may prove less
durable than less categorical arguments against broad access requirements."' 149 Even in the face of more intense judicial scrutiny or resistance, a
voluntary access system in the print media need not occasion rejection on
constitutional grounds. So long as voluntariness were the hallmark of the
scheme, media operators would be under no "compulsion to publish that
which 'reason' tells them should not be published.' 50
The success of a voluntary access plan, as in broadcasting, would depend upon the willingness of media operators to effectuate it. Again, as in
143. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 131 (1973).
144. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
145. Both broadcasters and publishers may be, and have been, subject to general laws not
directed toward the editorial process. See, e.g., Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33
(1937). Government intrusion into editorial decision-making, however, has been limited to the
electronic forum.
146. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969). See Joseph Burstyn, Inc.
v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
147. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973), citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969).
148. 395 U.S. at 388.
149. B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. PUBLIC AccEss 13 (1976).
150. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
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the electronic forum, adequate and non-coercive incentives would be available for at least encouraging experimentation. The Newspaper Preservation
Act (NPA),' 5 ' for instance, might be amended so that the availability of its
benefits were conditioned upon the willingness of publishers to adopt access.
152
The NPA was conceived as a rescue device for failing newspapers.
The Act permits newspapers in the same community to combine their business operations if: (1) one is in danger of probable failure,' 53 and (2) editorial and reporting functions are maintained independently. 54 If those
prerequisites are met and a joint operating agreement reached, the combina55
tion is immune from antitrust laws.'
Such efforts to promote diversity by protecting endangered newspapers
operate to preserve existing voices rather than attract new ones. An antitrust
exemption actually may place non-combination publishers at a competitive
disadvantage and thus discourage new publishing voices from competing
within and diversifying the media marketplace.1 56 Especially given such inherent disadvantages in the NPA's indirect diversification strategy, a voluntary access provision would seem to be an attractive way of enhancing the
NPA's effectiveness. By attaching the access condition to the NPA, communities endangered by the possible loss of a newspaper might be afforded an
additional measure of diversity insurance.
Although a voluntary access system may represent a form of governmental regulation which is consistent with first amendment rights, 5 7 it is
arguable that such public outlets as letters to the editor and op-ed sections in
newspapers already minimize the need for access in the print media. Selection and publication of letters and guest editorials, however, are controlled
by a newspaper editor's discretion. Under a voluntary access plan, space
would be available to the public without that screening. Absent such
editorial filtering, the public would have some "opportunity to take the initiative and editorial control into their own hands"' 58 - thus contributing to
more uninhibited public discussion from a multitude of tongues.
VI.

THE FUTURE OF ACCESS

Even if broader access opportunities were to materialize, the long term
future of access still would be shrouded in doubt. Access essentially is a remedial device arising from the principle "that a right of expression is somewhat thin if it can be exercised only at the sufferance of the managers of
mass communication."' 59 Access, therefore, ultimately is a response to the
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1801 (1976).
152. Id § 1801.

153. Id § 1803(b).
154. Id § 1802(2).
155. Id § 1803.
156. Newspapers protected by the NPA may realize economies of scale and advertising rateto-circulation ratios that may place competitors at a distinct disadvantage. See Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 624-26 (1953).
157. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
158. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 189 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
159. Barron, Access to ihe Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1641, 1646
(1967).
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"vast changes [that have placed] in a few hands the power to inform the
American people and shape public opinion." 1 60 Those underlying conditions, however, soon may be consigned to the past, thus disposing of the
concerns' 6 ' that have engendered the access concept.
Lack of competition within a particular medium has become one of the
most compelling arguments for expanding access rights.162 Such a premise,
which disregards and thus tends to undervalue any intermedia competition,
is the product of the compartmentalized perspective favored by the courts in
assessing different media forms. Aside from inadequately perceiving the
quality of competition in the information marketplace, such a disunified perspective of the mass media is unlikely to appreciate fully technological contributions toward creating new opportunities for multimedia competition
and expression.16 3 Even if progress did not improve the climate for diversity
within a given media form, diversity might flourish anyway if new media
forms expanded the contours and capabilities of the mass media. The evolution of the communications universe and intermedia competition to a higher
level could transform access into regulatory flotsam.
At the same time that government has endeavored with one hand to
promote diversity within the electronic forum, it has with the other delayed
the fruits of emerging or developing media forms. ' 64 By protecting over-theair broadcasters until recently from the competition of cable or subscription
television, for instance, the FCC obstructed the overall objective of diversity.
Such favoritism has been unraveling in the wake of court decisions striking
down protective policies 165 and in the face of agency and congressional deregulatory ambitions. 166 Pending the arrival of any new media order, affording inherent opportunities for multiple voices and views, access may be
the most acceptable means of promoting first amendment values without
burdening first amendment rights. Much as the access concept itself seeks to
dislodge poorly drawn but entrenched policies, access should carry the reminder that even if it is suitable for present needs it may become outmoded
and thus should be easily disposable if the future no longer requires its presence.

160. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 250 (1974).
161. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 158, n.8 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring). See BARRON, supra note 14, at 1678.
162. BARRON, supra note 14, at 1678.
163. Developing media technologies include satellite and laser transmission capabilities,
videocassettes and videodiscs, and cable and subscription television. Barrow and Manelli, Communications and Technolog--A Forecast of Change (Part ), 34 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 205 (1969).
Cablecasting's multiple channel and two-way capacities may play particularly prominent roles
in converting spectrum scarcity into abundance and diversifying programming. Note, Cable
Television and Content Regulation. The FCC, the First Amendment and the Electronic Newspaper, 51
N.Y.U. L. REv. 133, 134, 137 (1976).
164. For a review of FCC rules that until recently governed and inhibited cable and subscription television, see Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C.Cir. 1977).
165. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,
567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
166. See BROADCASTING, May 8, 1978, at 32, Jan. 2, 1978, at 46-48.

